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MALPRACTICE LIABILITY OF COMPANY
DOCTORS IN WISCONSIN
I. INTRODUCTION
Wisconsin joined a growing number of states in 1978 when
it amended the exclusive remedy provision of its Worker's
Compensation Act' to bar an employee from bringing a com-
mon-law tort action against a co-employee.2 This amendment
was a long-overdue realization that co-employee immunity is
consistent with the theory of worker's compensation. The
amendment, however, should not be construed as abrogating
the common-law right of an employee to bring a malpractice
action against a company doctor simply because they share a
common employer.
This Comment criticizes the majority view that co-em-
ployee immunity extends to company doctors because it arbi-
trarily destroys the traditional common-law duties of a group
of doctors and is wholly inconsistent with the policy consider-
ations upon which the law of worker's compensation was
founded. In addition, this Comment will examine the ap-
proaches courts in other jurisdictions have taken in attempt-
ing to deal with the issue of company doctor immunity and
will offer a simple solution for courts in Wisconsin.
II. BACKGROUND
Worker's compensation law was designed to alleviate the
hardships employees faced when seeking redress for their
1. Wis. STAT. § 102 (1983-84). Wisconsin was one of the pioneers in enacting a
worker's compensation act in 1911. See generally Barry, Judicial Construction of Cer-
tain Provisions of the Workmen's Compensation Act, 17 MARQ. L. REV. 174 (1932-33);
Babcock, The Workmen's Compensation Act in Wisconsin, 3 MARQ. L. REV. 112 (1918-
19).
2. Wis. STAT. § 102.03(2) (1983-84) provides:
Where such conditions exist the right to the recovery of compensation under
this chapter shall be the exclusive remedy against the employer, any other em-
ploye of the same employer and the worker's compensation insurance carrier.
This section does not limit the right of an employe to bring action against any
coemployee for an assault intended to cause bodily harm, or against a coem-
ployee for negligent operation of a motor vehicle not owned or leased by the
employer, or against a coemployee of the same employer to the extent that there
would be liability of a governmental unit to pay judgments against employees
under a collective bargaining agreement or a local ordinance. (emphasis added).
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work-related injuries and to provide them with an effective
and consistent remedy. 3 At common law, an injured em-
ployee's only recourse was a tort action against the employer
or against a fellow employee. Because of the difficulty of
proving negligence in a complex industrial environment, 4 cou-
pled with the availability of the common-law defenses of con-
tributory negligence,5 assumption of risk,6 and the fellow-
servant doctrine,7 injured workers were often left without an
adequate remedy.8 Worker's compensation represented a
break with common-law tort principles in that a right to relief
was based upon the fact of employment rather than upon
fault. 9 To receive compensation, the employee must merely
show that the injury resulted from an accident that arose out
of and in the course of employment. 10 The employee and the
employer engage in a quidpro quo. The employee gives up his
right to sue his employer in tort and possibly receive a greater
award of damages but, in return, receives immediate, though
partial, compensation for lost wages and medical expenses.
The employer relinquishes the right to assert the common-law
defenses but escapes costly litigation and extravagant ver-
dicts.11 The employer is required to insure itself through pri-
vate insurance, state-fund insurance, or self-insurance. These
costs are ultimately reflected in the price of the employer's
goods or services and thus passed on to the consumers of the
product. 12
3. 1 A. LARSON, WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION LAW, § 2.20 at 5-7 (1982) [herein-
after cited as A. LARSON].
4. Id. § 4.40, at 28.
5. W. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS § 80, at 527 (4th ed. 1971)
[hereinafter cited as PROSSER].
6. Id.
7. Id. § 80, at 528-30.
8. 1 A. LARSON, supra note 3, § 4.30, at 25-28.
9. "Thus, the test is not the relation of an individual's personal quality (fault) to an
event, but the relationship of an event to an employment. The essence of applying the
test is not a matter of assessing blame, but of marking out boundaries." Id. § 2.10, at 5.
See also Cudahy Packing Co. v. Parramore, 263 U.S. 418, 423 (1923).
10. This is the language used in the typical worker's compensation statute. See 1
A. LARSON, supra note 3, § 1.10, at I.
11. See generally id. § 1.10, at 1-2.
12. The cost of insurance is not placed on the public as a whole, as in a pure social
insurance system, but is placed ultimately on the consumers of the particular product.
This sets up a relationship between the hazards of the particular industry, the cost of
insurance to the employer, and the price of the particular product produced. See 1 A.
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One of the problems encountered by legislators in develop-
ing their worker's compensation schemes is outlining tile pe-
rimeters of immunity. Virtually all worker's compensation
acts preserve the right of an employee to bring a common-law
tort action against third parties, 13 based on the idea that the
ultimate loss should fall on the wrongdoer.14 Many jurisdic-
tions, however, have recognized sound economic reasons for
extending tort immunity to employees for work-related acci-
dents in which they are at fault. 5 This is based upon a quid
LARSON, supra note 3, § 3.20, at 17-18. See also Val Blatz Brewing Co. v. Industrial
Comm'n, 201 Wis. 474, 478, 230 N.W. 622 (1930).
13. 2A A. LARSON, supra note 3, § 71.00, at 14-1.
14. Id. § 71.10, at 14-1. See Severin v. Luchinske, 271 Wis. 378, 73 N.W.2d 477
(1955); Piper, Problems in Third Party Action Procedure Under the Wisconsin Worker's
Compensation Act, 60 MARQ. L. REV. 91, 92 (1976).
15. The following jurisdictions have statutory co-employee immunity: Alaska:
ALASKA STAT. § 23.30.015(a)(1984); California: CAL. LAB. CODE § 3601(a) (West
Supp. 1984); Colorado: COLO. REV. STAT. § 8-52-108(1)(Supp. 1983); Connecticut:
CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 31-293a (Supp. 1984); Delaware: DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 19,
§ 2363(a)(Supp. 1982); Georgia: GA. CODE ANN. § 34-9-11 (1982); Hawaii: HAWAII
REV. STAT. § 386-8 (1976); Illinois: ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 48, § 138.5(a) (Supp. 1983);
Indiana: IND. CODE ANN. § 22-3-2-13 (West Supp. 1983); Iowa: IOWA CODE ANN.
§ 85.20 (West Supp. 1983); Kansas: KAN. STAT. ANN. § 44-504(a)(1981); Kentucky:
KY. REV. STAT. ANN § 342.690(1)(Baldwin 1979); Louisana: LA. REV. STAT. ANN.
§ 23:1032 (West Supp. 1985); Michigan: MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 418.827(1)(West
Supp. 1984); Montana: MONT. CODE ANN. § 39-71-412 (1983); Nevada: NEV. REV.
STAT. § 616.560(1)(1983); New Hampshire: N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 281.12 (Supp.
1979); New Jersey: N.J. STAT. ANN. § 34:15-8 (West Supp. 1984); New Mexico: N.M.
STAT. ANN. § 52-1-60 (Supp. 1984); New York: N.Y. WORK. COMP. LAW 29(1)(Con-
sol. Supp. 1984); North Carolina: N.C. GEN. STAT. § 97-9, 97-10.1 (Supp. 1983); North
Dakota: N.D. CENT. CODE § 65-01-08 (Supp. 1983); Ohio: OHIO REV. CODE ANN.
§ 4123. 741 (1974); Oklahoma: OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 85, § 44(a)(West Supp. 1984);
Oregon: OR. REV. STAT. § 656.018(3) (1983); Pennsylvania: PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 77,
§ 72 (Supp. 1984); Rhode Island: R.I. GEN. LAWS § 28-29-20 (Supp. 1984); South Car-
olina: S.C. CODE ANN. § 42-1-540 (Law. Co-op. 1985); Texas: TEX. REV. Civ. STAT.
ANN. art. 8306, § 3(d) (Vernon Supp. 1985); Utah: UTAH CODE ANN. § 35-1-62 (Supp.
1983); Virginia: VA. CODE § 65.1-41 (Supp. 1983); Washington: WASH. REV. CODE
ANN. § 51.24.030 (Supp. 1983); West Virginia: W. VA. CODE § 23-2-6(a)(Supp. 1981);
Wyoming: Wyo. STAT. 27-12-103(a) (1983).
Although other jurisdictions do not expressly provide for co-employee immunity,
some courts have construed their statutes to imply it. The Idaho Supreme Court has
held employees immune from suits by co-employees because they are agents of the em-
ployer and thus share his immunity. See, e.g., White v. Ponozzo, 77 Idaho 276, 291 P.2d
843 (1955); House v. Mine Safety Appliances Co., 417 F. Supp. 939, 947 (D. Idaho
1976); Nichols v. Godfrey, 90 Idaho 345, 411 P.2d 763 (1966), construing, IDAHO CODE
§§ 72-211, 72-223(1)(Supp. 1984). The Courts in Massachusetts have also construed
their statute, MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 152, § 15 (Supp. 1983), to allow the co-
employee to share the employer's immunity. See, e.g., Rood's Case, 7 Mass. 915, 388
N.E.2d 1219 (App. Ct. 1979); Saharceski v. Marcure, 373 Mass. 304, 366 N.E.2d 1245
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pro quo among employees: each gives up common-law rights
against the others in exchange for tort immunity. Because
third parties are not involved in the quid pro quo, they should
not be afforded immunity for their negligent acts. 16 Also, the
industry and the consuming public should not have to bear
the cost of injuries caused by those persons whose activity is
unrelated to the workplace. Conversely, accidents caused by
employees are work-related, common-place and inevitable oc-
curences, and thus, the cost of such should be borne by the
(1977). The Mississippi Supreme Court, in construing Miss. CODE ANN. § 71-3-71
(Supp. 1984) said allowing suits against co-employees "would effectively transfer the
ultimate burden of providing compensation from the industry where it belongs, to fel-
low servants, where it does not belong." McCluskey v. Thompson, 363 So. 2d 256, 259
(Miss. 1978). See also Kipnis v. Antoine, 472 F. Supp. 215 (N.D. Miss. 1979). Courts
in Tennessee have likewise interpreted their statute, TENN. CODE ANN. § 50-6-108
(Supp. 1984), to imply co-employee immunity. See, e.g., Mills v. Pigg, 54 Tenn. 612, -,
393 S.W.2d 28, 32 (Ct. App. 1965); Sturkie v. Bottoms, 203 Tenn. 237, -, 310 S.W.2d
451, 452 (1958). See also 2A A. LARSON, supra note 3, § 72.12-.22, at 14-59-14-88.
In the following jursdictions, courts have construed their statutes as providing for
no co-employee immunity: Arkansas: ARK. STAT. ANN. § 81-1340(a)(1)(Supp. 1983),
construed in Neal v. Oliver, 246 Ark. 377, 438 S.W.2d 313 (1969); Florida: FLA. STAT.
ANN § 440.39(1)(West Supp. 1985), construed in Dessert v. Electric Mutual Liability
Ins. Co., 392 So. 2d 340 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1981); Maine: ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit.
39, § 68 (Supp. 1983); Maryland: MD. ANN. CODE art. 101, § 58 (Supp. 1983), con-
strued in Connor v. Hauch, 50 Md. App. 217, 437 A.2d 661 (1981), afl'd, 29 Md. 120,
453 A.2d 1207 (1983); Minnesota: MINN. STAT. ANN. § 176.061(l)(West Supp. 1984),
construed in Peterson v. Kludt, 317 N.W.2d 43, 48 (1982)(election of worker's compen-
sation benefits prevents employee from suing someone engaged in a common enterprise
and with a common insured employer); Missouri: Mo. STAT. ANN. § 287.150 (Vernon
Supp. 1984), construed in State ex rel. Badami v. Gaertner, 630 S.W.2d 175 (Mo. Ct.
App. 1982); Nebraska: NEB. REv. STAT. § 48-118 (1984), construed in Rehn v. Gin-
gaman, 151 Neb. 196, 36 N.W.2d 856 (1949); South Dakota: S.D. COMP. LAWS ANN.
§ 62-4-38 (Supp. 1983), construed in Blumhardt v. Hartung, - S.D. -, 283 N.W.2d
229, 231 (1979); Vermont: VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 21, § 624 (Supp. 1983), construed in
Steele v. Eaton, 130 Vt. 1, 285 A.2d 749 (1971).
In Alabama the Supreme Court struck down its co-employee immunity statute,
ALA. CODE § 25-5-11 (Supp. 1984) because it deprived the injured employee of rights
and remedies guaranteed by the ALABAMA CONSTITUTION. Pipkin v. Southern Elec. &
Pipefitting Co., 358 So. 2d 1015 (Ala. 1978). The Arizona Supreme Court in Halenar v.
Superior Court, 109 Ariz. 27, 504 P.2d 928 (1972), declared its co-employee immunity
statute unconstitutional only to have co-employee immunity restored through constitu-
tional amendment. ARiz. CONST. art. XVIII, § 8.
See also 2A A. LARSON, supra note 3, § 72.22, at 14-86; Marks, Erosion of the Ex-
clusive Worker's Compensation Remedy: Suits Against Coemployees and Compensation
Carriers, 17 FORUM 395, 396-97 (1981) [hereinafter cited as Marks]; Note, The No-
Duty Rule in New York. Should Company Doctors be Considered Co-employees? 9 HOF-
STRA L. REv. 665, 675 n.72 (1981) [hereinafter cited as Note, The No Duty Rule].
16. 2A A. LARSON, supra note 3, § 72.61(b), at 14-205.
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industry and, ultimately, the consumers of the product.' 7 Al-
lowing employees to sue one another for work-related negli-
gence' would simply shift the burden of industrial accidents
from one employee to another, effectively defeating the pur-
pose of worker's compensation.' 9 Because the states' co-em-
ployee immunity provisions create no exceptions for different
classes of employees, company doctors are impliedly immune
from liability arising from their negligent acts. z0
III. A LOOK AT THE DEVELOPMENT OF WISCONSIN'S
WORKER'S COMPENSATION ACT
Wisconsin amended section 102.03(2),21 the exclusive rem-
edy provision of its worker's compensation act,22 to extending
tort immunity to "any employe of the same employer. 23
Although there have been no decisions on the applicability of
section 102.03(2) since its amendment, 4 an examination of
17. See Marks, supra note 15, at 396-97.
18. An often quoted case against co-employee immunity is the English case of Lees
v. Dunkerley Bros., 1911 A.C. 5, 103, L.TL 467, 468 (Eng. 1910), where Lord Chancel-
lor Loveburn stated, "I can hardly imagine a more dangerous or mischievous principle
than [co-employee immunity] .... [such immunity] would mean a free hand to every-
body to neglect his duty towards his fellow servant and escape with impunity from all
liability for damages for the consequences of his own carelessness or neglect of duty."
19. Oliver v. Travelers Ins. Co., 103 Wis. 2d 644, 648, 309 N.W.2d 383, 385 (Ct.
App. 1981). Employees would not only be subject to a suit for negligence and a possible
judgment for damages but would also be subject to reimbursement liability for compen-
sation paid to the injured worker by the employer or the employer's insurance carrier.
Id. at 649 & n.2, 309 N.W.2d at 385-86 & n.2.
20. Co-employee immunity has been criticized for several reasons: it shifts the bur-
den of proving negligence to the employee; it deprives the employee of the opportunity
to sue the co-worker and obtain a more complete recovery, and it encourages careless
conduct. See Note, The Malpractice Liability of Company Physicians, 53 IND. L.J. 585,
596-97 (1978) [hereinafter cited as Note, Company Physicians]. See generally Note, The
Third Party Action-Expanding the Circle of Immunity: Coemployees, 48 Miss. L.J. 87
(1977).
21. 1977 Wis. Laws 195, § 2.
22. Wis. STAT. § 102.03(l)(c)1 (1983-84).
23. Wis. STAT. § 102.03(2) (1983-84).
24. For cases prior to the amendment allowing suits against co-employees see Laf-
fin v. Chemical Supply Co., 77 Wis. 2d 353, 253 N.W.2d 51 (1977) (corporate officer
acting as co-employee is liable as one); Pitrowski v. Taylor, 55 Wis. 2d 615, 201 N.W.2d
52 (1972) (corporate officer engaging in acts of employees is liable as a co-employee);
Zimmerman v. Wisconsin Elec. Power Co., 38 Wis. 2d 626, 157 N.W.2d 648 (1968)(leg-
islature never intended co-employees to be immune); Severin v. Luchinske, 271 Wis.
378, 73 N.W.2d 477 (1955)(co-employee is a "third party"); Bernard v. Jennings, 209
Wis. 116, 244 N.W. 589 (1932) (co-employees owe each other the duty to exercise ordi-
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Wisconsin's legislative history shows an effort to protect an
injured worker's right to maintain a common-law tort action
against an attending doctor.
Prior to 1917, the employee had to elect whether to pursue
worker's compensation benefits from the employer or bring a
tort action against a third party.26 If the employee elected to
pursue an action against a third party, he waived his right to
compensation from the employer. However, if the employee
chose to accept worker's compensation benefits, he assigned
his cause of action against the third party to his employer.
The Wisconsin Supreme Court held that the assigned cause of
action against a third party included actions against doctors
for malpractice. In Pawlak v. Hayes28 the injured employee
discovered, after receiving compensation benefits from his em-
ployer, that his doctor's negligence had aggravated his origi-
nal injury.29 The court allowed the employee to return the
compensation benefits and bring an action against the doctor
because there was no election, and thus no assignment, until
the facts creating third party liability came into existence.3"
nary care in discharging the duties of the common employer); McGonigle v. Gryphan,
201 Wis. 269, 272, 229 N.W. 81, 83 (1930) (citing Lees v. Dunkerley Bros. 1911 A.C. 5,
103 L. T. Rep. 467, 468 (Eng. 1910).
25. See Jenkins v. Sabourin, 104 Wis. 2d 309, 338-39 n.15, 311 N.W.2d 600, 614
n.11 (1981)(Abrahamson, J., dissenting).
26. 1915 Wis. Laws § 2394-95(1). See also Pawlak v. Hayes, 162 Wis. 503, 505,
156 N.W. 464, 465 (1916).
27. Pawlak, 162 Wis. at 505-06, 156 N.W. at 465. A claim under the Worker's
Compensation Act did not completely cut off the worker's rights against the third party.
An assignment of the employee's cause of action to the employer was merely for the
purpose of reimbursing the employer for the amount paid the employee. Any judgment
in excess of that amount, less the reasonable cost of collection, belonged to the em-
ployee. Cermak v. Milwaukee Air Power Pump Co., 192 Wis. 44, 48, 211 N.W. 354,
356 (1927). The employer could also reassign the cause of action back to the employee,
as was done in Cermak. Also, if the action by the employer against the third party was
not commenced within 90 days of a written demand by the injured employee, the em-
ployee could maintain the action in his own name. Wis. STAT. § 102.29 (1923).
The original section, 1911 Wis. Laws 664, § 4 merely said the claim by the employee
for compensation should operate as an assignment of the cause of action. It was
amended by 1913 Wis. Laws 599, making a claim by the employee against a third party
a waiver of any claim for compensation. See Employers Mut. Liab. Ins. Co. v. Icke, 225
Wis. 304, 274 N.W. 283 (1937).
28. 162 Wis. 503, 156 N.W. 464.
29. Id. at 504, 156 N.W. at 465.
30. Id. at 506, 156 N.W. at 465.
1985]
MARQUETTE LAW REVIEW
In 1917 the legislature provided that although a claim for
compensation benefits precluded the injured employee from
bringing an action against a third party, the employee could
claim benefits under worker's compensation and still maintain
an action against any physician or surgeon for malpractice.3'
The recovery, if any, in such action was reduced by the
amount of compensation paid by the employer to the em-
ployee due to the malpractice. 32  The Wisconsin Supreme
Court in Lakeside Bridge & Steel Co. v. Pugh33 explained that
the new statute was merely a modification of the original
waiver section; it did not create in the employee a new cause
of action for malpractice because this cause of action already
existed at common-law. 34
In 1931 the legislature further expanded the rights of the
injured employee by allowing him to accept worker's compen-
sation benefits and pursue a tort claim against third parties.35
This made the recovery process less complex and eliminated
the necessity of an assignment to the employee of a cause of
action that the employer did not wish to pursue.36 The sec-
31. 1917 Wis. Laws 624 § 2394-24. Remaining substantially unchanged today, the
present version, Wis. STAT. § 102.29(3) (1983-84) provides:
Nothing in this chapter shall prevent an employe from taking the compensation
he or she may be entitled to under it and also maintaining a civil action against
any physician, chiropractor or podiatrist for malpractice. The employer or com-
pensation insurer shall have no interest in or right to share in the proceeds of any
civil action against any physician, chiropractor, or podiatrist for malpractice.
This was done "to restore to an injured employee the right to collect damages from a
physician who has treated him unskillfully." Bull. of Indus. Commission of Wis., Sept.
1, 1917, at 34. The original section held the physician liable only for damages from
malpractice that occurred within the 90 day period in which he was bound to provide
medical services.
32. This set up two independent causes of action against the physician: one by the
employee to recover damages due to the malpractice less the compensation recovered
from the employer for the malpractice, and the other by the employer to recover the
amount of compensation paid to the employee due to the malpractice. Thus the em-
ployee did not recover double damages and the physician was responsible for the entire
amount of damages arising from his negligence. Lakeside Bridge & Steel Co. v. Pugh,
206 Wis. 62, 67-68, 238 N.W. 872, 875 (1931). In 1919 section 102.29(3) was amended
to allow the employee the benefit of any recovery in excess of the amount paid by the
employer or the employer's insurance carrier. Employers Mut. Liab. Ins. Co., 225 Wis.
at 307, 274 N.W. at 285.
33. 206 Wis. 62, 238 N.W. 872 (1931).
34. Id at 67, 238 N.W. at 874.
35. 1931 Wis. Laws 132 (presently Wis. STAT. § 102.29 (1981 - 82)).
36. See Employer's Mut. Liab. Ins. Co., 225 Wis. at 307-08, 274 N.W. at 285.
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tion, remaining substantially unchanged today, provided that
the employer or his insurer could join in the action and the
recovery against the third party would be divided as follows:
one-third to the employee, the remaining two-thirds (less the
reasonable cost of collection) to the employer as reimburse-
ment for the amount paid as compensation to the employee,
with any remaining going to the employee.3
Finally, in 1949, the legislature eliminated the employer's
right to reimbursement from the employee for any amount re-
covered in a third-party action against a physician.38
Although this is inconsistent with basic tort principles which
deny an injured party double recovery for injuries resulting
from malpractice, 39 this provision, along with the other enact-
ments mentioned previously, clearly demonstrates the legisla-
ture's intent to protect the injured employee's right to sue a
doctor for malpractice regardless of the benefits received
through the worker's compensation act.4° The amendment of
section 102.03(2) extending immunity for liability for work-
related negligence to employees raises doubt as to whether the
right to sue a company doctor still exists. It appears that by
leaving unchanged section 102.29(3)-preserving the right of
an employee to bring a malpractice action against any physi-
cian-the legislature is impliedly excepting doctors from the
co-employee immunity provision. Taking an opposite view-
that the co-employee immunity provision excepts company
doctors from liability-would frustrate the purposes of
worker's compensation law and would eliminate a right that
has been carefully protected by the legislature since 1917.41
Courts in other jurisdictions, deciding the issue of company
doctor immunity without the benefit of a physician liability
37. See generally Diedrick v. Hartford Accident & Indemnity Co., 62 Wis. 2d 759,
216 N.W.2d 193 (1974). Curiously, it took fours years for the legislature to amend Wis.
STAT. § 102.29(4) to allow the employee a full recovery against a physician. See 1935
Wis. Laws 465.
38. Wis. STAT. § 102.29(3)(1949).
39. See Jenkins, 104 Wis. 2d at 339 n.15, 311 N.W.2d at 614 n.ll. (Abrahamson,
J., dissenting). This result is criticized by Professor Larson who characterizes Wiscon-
sin's action in creating this provision as "driven no doubt by its restless pioneering
urge." 2A A. LARSON, supra note 3, 2.72.65(e), at 14-224.
40. See Jenkins, 104 Wis. 2d at 339 n.15, 311 N.W.2d at 614 n.15.
41. See supra note 20 and accompanying text.
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section similar to 102.29(3), have used different theories to cir-
cumvent their co-employee immunity provisions.
IV. OTHER APPROACHES TO COMPANY DOCTOR
IMMUNITY
Several courts, apparently unwilling to relieve company
doctors of their common-law liability for malpractice, have
held that the doctor was not a co-employee either because (1)
he was not subject to the employer's right to control and thus
was an independent contractor, or (2) he was acting in dual
capacities, one of a co-employee and one of a licensed physi-
cian. Neither of these theories provide a court with workable
guidelines. In applying the two theories, courts have resorted
to a strained construction of their worker's compensation stat-
utes, drawn meaningless distinctions, and have added confu-
sion to an already complex area of the law.
A. The Independent Contractor Theory
Generally, courts have held that independent contractors
are not employees and are therefore subject to common-law
liability as third parties under their worker's compensation
acts.4 2 To determine whether someone is an employee for
worker's compensation purposes, courts have looked to the
traditional common-law relationship of master and servant
and applied the right to control test:43 if the employer has the
right to control the physical conduct of the worker in the per-
formance of his service, then the worker is to be considered an
employee and not an independent contractor." Some courts
have applied this test, with minor variations, to determine
whether company doctors were employees under their co-em-
ployee immunity provisions.
42. 81 AM. JUR. 2D Workmen's Compensation § 66 at 754 (1976).
43. For a criticism of the test as applied to compensation law, see IC A. LARSON,
supra note 3, §§ 44.00-44.35, at 8-31-8-136. Professor Larson lists the principal fac-
tors showing the right to control as: "(1) direct evidence of right or exercise of control;
(2) method of payment; (3) the furnishing of equipment; and (4) the right to fire." Id.
§ 44.00, at 8-31.
44. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY §§ 2, 220 (1958); Note, Company Physi-
cians, supra note 20, at 588-89. See generally Annot., 28 A.L.R.3d 1066 (1969).
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In 1931, in Hoffman v. Houston Clinic,45 the Texas Civil
Court of Appeals held that the plaintiff, after losing an eye
due to the negligent treatment by a company doctor, was not
barred from maintaining a suit for malpractice because the
doctor was not an" 'agent,' 'servant,' or 'employee' of the em-
ployer."'46 Although the court did not elucidate which factors
it considered controlling, two later cases expressly applied the
right to control test and compared their facts with Hoffman.
In 1943, the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals in Martin v.
Consolidated Casualty Ins. Co.,47 applying Texas law, held
that an employee could not bring a malpractice action against
a doctor acting as an agent of the insurer.48 The court readily
distinguished Hoffman because in this case, the doctor acted
upon the "express instruction" of the insurance company in
treating the plaintiff.49 In Hoffman, the court noted, there
was merely an order saying, "Please render necessary treat-
ment to S.R. Hoffman who was injured while in our employ
engaged in his regular occupation." 50 While the Martin court
did not say how specific the instructions had to be, it con-
cluded that the doctor in this case was under the "direction
and control of the company.""
More than twenty years later the Texas Supreme Court in
McKelvey v. Barber5 2 held that a doctor was not immune from
a suit for malpractice despite the fact that he could be consid-
ered the employer's agent for some purposes.- 3 The court ex-
plained, saying "[a]n important consideration in such cases is
whether the employer had that right to control the physical
details as to the manner of performance which is characteris-
tic of the relationship of master and servant. ' 54 The court
then underwent a more extensive analysis of the facts than in
the previous two cases, in light of the right to control test. The
45. 41 S.W.2d 134 (Tex. Civ. App. 1931).
46. Id. at 139. See TEx. REv. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 8306, § 3 (Vernon Supp.
1983); 41 S.W.2d at 139.
47. 138 F.2d 896 (5th Cir. 1943).
48. Id at 899.
49. Id.
50. Id.; 41 S.W.2d at 134.
51. 138 F.2d at 899.
52. 381 S.W.2d 59 (Tex. 1964).
53. Id. at 63.
54. Id. at 62-63.
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court concluded that, although the defendant was a company
doctor, the fact that he was engaged in the general practice of
medicine, that only 15 to 20 percent of his practice was of an
industrial nature, that he was not on a retainer but was paid
for services when rendered, and that his charges for treating
employees were paid by the compensation carrier while the
employer paid the doctor's fee for physical examinations,
showed he was not under the control of the employer and thus
was not an "agent, servant, or employee. 55
Courts in Indiana have taken a different approach. In
Ross v. Schubert5 6 the Indiana Court of Appeals disregarded a
factual analysis and instead held that all company doctors are
independent contractors because the legislature, in adopting a
co-employee immunity provision, could never have intended
to immunize company doctors against malpractice actions.5 7
The court rationalized this result by saying that company doc-
tors are independent contractors because the employer cannot
control the manner in which the work is performed. 8 Also,
the court explained, the liability of such doctors arises from
the physician-patient relationship, not from the employer-em-
ployee relationship.5 9 "To hold otherwise," reasoned the
court, "would encourage the company physician to be less as-
siduous. ' 60 A fear of rampant malpractice among company
doctors and a concern for the well being of the injured worker
apparently were the predominant considerations in prompting
the court to make this sweeping judgment.61 This decision,
relied on in three subsequent cases, 62 was criticized by Profes-
sor Larson, perhaps the leading authority on worker's com-
pensation law, because company doctors in Indiana, like those
in Texas, can be considered employees for purposes of com-
55. Id. at 63.
56. 180 Ind. App. 402, 388 N.E.2d 623 (1979).
57. Id. at 626.
58. Id. at 629.
59. Id.
60. Id.
61. Id. See also 2A A. LARSON, supra note 3, § 72.61(b), at 14-204.
62. The cases are McDaniel v. Sage, - Ind. App. -, 419 N.E.2d 1322 (1981);
Stevens v. Kimmel, 182 Ind. App. 187, 394 N.E.2d 232 (1979); McLaughlin v. Ameri-
can Oil Co., 181 Ind. App. 356, 391 N.E.2d 864 (1979).
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pensation benefits and independent contractors for malprac-
tice claims.63
Courts in Pennsylvania have declined to follow Indiana's
lead in classifying all company doctors as independent con-
tractors and instead have examined the particular facts of
each case in applying the traditional right to control test. In
Lemonovich v. Klimoski" an injured employee brought a mal-
practice action against his employer's "surgical liason officer"
who was responsible for attending to hospitalized employees.
The federal court, construing Pennsylvania law, explained
that the "particular criterion which distinguishes an em-
ployer-employee relationship from an independent contractor
relationship is the right to control the means of accomplishing
the result. '6'  The court held that instructions from the em-
ployer directing the doctor to act as "surgical liason officer"
and to refer certain problems to certain specialists was not
enough to confer upon the employer any right to control the
doctor or establish an employer-employee relationship.66
More recently, the Pennsylvania Superior Court has found
the facts existing in two cases sufficient to establish that the
doctor was subject to the employer's right to control and thus
was an employee rather than an independent contractor. In
63. 2A A. LARSON, supra note 3, § 72.61(b), at 14-204. Professor Larson claims
that his holding breaks down the quid pro quo among employees because the doctor
loses his right to sue co-employees while remaining liable to such suits himself. Id. at
14-205 to 14-206. This argument is weak because company doctors are rarely in a posi-
tion to be harmed by the negligence of a co-employee. See infra note 135 and accompa-
nying text.
Wisconsin has a statute which expressly provides for independent contractors to be
considered employees under certain conditions. Wis. STAT. § 102.07(8)(1983-84)
provides:
Every independent contractor who does not maintain a separate business and
who does not hold himself out to and render service to the public, provided he is
not himself an employer subject to this chapter or has not complied with the
conditions of § 1.2.28(2), shall for the purpose of this chapter be an employee of
any employer under this chapter for whom he is performing service in the course
of the trade, business, profession or occupation of such employer at the time of
injury.
See United Way of Greater Milwaukee, Inc. v. DILHR, 105 Wis. 2d 447, 452, 313
N.W.2d 858, 861 (Ct. App. 1981); Employers Mut. Liab. Ins. Co. v. DILHR, 52 Wis.
2d 515, 520, 190 N.W.2d 907, 910, (1971); Ace Refrigeration & Heating Co. v. Indus-
trial Comm'n, 32 Wis. 2d 311, 317-18, 145 N.W.2d 777, 780 (1966).
64. 315 F. Supp. 1290 (W.D. Pa. 1970).




Babich v. Pavich67 the court held that a company doctor was
"in the same employ" as the deceased worker and was thus
immune from liability for negligently causing his death.6 The
court, in looking at the totality of the circumstances, seemed
to ignore the Lemonovich test:
Although the record does indicate that Bethlehem does not
control the manner and method of treating patients, this fact
alone is not controlling in determining whether appellee is
an employee or independent contractor. The following facts
point to the conclusion that appellee is an employee rather
than an independent contractor: he worked for Bethlehem
on a full-time basis; Bethlehem paid him a fixed salary and
did not allow him to engage in private practice; his fringe
benefits were the same as those received by Bethlehem's su-
pervisory employees; and Bethlehem controlled the hours
and number of days that appellee worked.69
The court in Budzichowski v. Bell Telephone Co. 70 held
that two company doctors were not independent contractors
but employees and thus immune from a claim for malpractice
brought by a telephone installer. The court found all the facts
listed in Babich present here, except that there was no prohibi-
tion against engaging in an outside practice. The court did
not consider this to be significant but noted that the fact that
the doctors in this case were supervised by a company doctor
made the case for finding the doctors to be employees stronger
here than in Babich.71
67. 488 Pa. Super. 124, 411 A.2d 218 (1979).
68. Id. at-, 411 A.2d at 219.
69. Id. at-, 411 A.2d at 221. The court, in answering the argument that doctors
as professional people exercising independent judgment should not be considered to be
"in the same employ" as the injured worker, reasoned that accepting this principle
would lead to exempting all full-time salaried professionals, such as accountants, archi-
tects, attorneys, and engineers, from co-employee immunity. Id. The court also noted
that a determination that doctors should be liable for their negligence should be left to
the legislature. Id.
70. 299 Pa. Super. 392, 445 A.2d 811 (1982).
71. Id. at -, 445 A.2d at 813. More recently the Pennsylvania Superior Court in
Kinloch v. Tonsey, - Pa. Super. -, 473 A.2d 167 (1984), relied on the Budzichowski
decision in affirming the trial court's grant of summary judgment for a company doctor.
The court held that the doctor was an employee and not an independent contractor
despite being employed by a private physician and several hospitals on nights and week-
ends. The court pointed out that the doctor was employed as the company medical
director which required him to be on the plant premises from 8 a.m. to 4 p.m. every
weekday, he was compensated in the same manner as other employees, and his outside
employment was not in any way connected with his duties as medical director of the
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The right to control test has often been criticized because
it is difficult to apply, has few ascertainable standards, and is
really an inference or conclusion rather than a demonstrable
fact.72 These shortcomings are even more glaring when apply-
ing the test to a company doctor. 3 Because a doctor must
exercise independent medical judgment in the performance of
his professional skills, the manner in which the doctor per-
forms his work74 cannot be controlled by a lay person. To
hold otherwise ignores reality and accentuates the inapplica-
bility of the right to control test in compensation law.75 Other
courts have recognized this fact and have resorted to other
approaches to determine the status of company doctors.76
company. The court declined to hold that all company doctors are independent con-
tractors, explaining that such a rule was best left to the legislature. Id. at -, 473 A.2d
at 170.
The Georgia Court of Appeals also used the right to control test to determine
whether a company doctor was an employee or an independent contractor. In Bexley v.
Southwire, 168 Ga. App. 431, 309 S.E.2d 379 (1983), a trial court granted summary
judgment for a company doctor based on Georgia's co-employee immunity provision,
GA. CODE ANN. S. 34-9-11 (1982). The court of appeals looked at various factors: the
doctor worked at the facility full-time, was paid a salary not based upon the number of
employees he saw, had an office located in the facility, had equipment and supplies
provided by the employer, and had his work periodically reviewed by his supervisors.
Bexley, 168 Ga. App. at -, 309 S.E.2d at 381. The court noted that the evidence also
showed that the doctor was in charge of the company's health services, that he had
absolute discretion and authority to determine what tests to administer to employees,
and that the results of the tests were not revealed to the company but remained subject
to the doctor-patient privilege. Id. at -, 309 S.E.2d at 381-82. The court of appeals
reasoned that, in light of the confficting evidence, the issue of whether the doctor was
subject to the company's right to control was a question for the jury. Accordingly, the
court reversed the trial court's order granting summary judgment for the doctor. Id. at
309 S.E.2d at 382.
72. See, e.g., 1C A. LARSON, supra note 3, §§ 44.00 at 8-31, 45.00 at 8-137; Note,
Company Physicians, supra note 20, at 592-93; Comment, Employee or Independent
Contractor: The Need for a Reassessment of the Standard Used Under California Work-
men's Compensation, 10 U.S.F.L. REv. 133, 141 (1975).
73. See Note, Company Physicians, supra note 20, at 591-92.
74. Id. See Boyle v. Breme, 93 N.J. 569, -, 461 A.2d 1164, 1166 (1983) (Handler,
J., dissenting).
75. See Pierce v. Ortho Pharmaceutical Corp., 84 N.J. 58, 71, 417 A.2d 505, 512
(1980): "Employees who are professionals owe a special duty to abide not only by fed-
eral and state law, but also by the recognized codes of ethics of their professions. That
duty may oblige them to decline to perform acts required by their employers."
76. See, e.g., Note, Company Physicians, supra note 20, at 591-93; Bryant v. Dough-
erty, 267 N.C. 545, 148 S.E.2d 548 (1966)(physician not "conducting the business" of
the employer); Fauver v. Bell, 192 Va. 518, 65 S.E.2d 575, 581 (1954) (not engaged in
business pursuit of employer); Gay v. Greene, 91 Ga. App. 78, 84 S.E.2d 847 (1954)
(physician acting in his own profession); Howard v. Berg, 86 Pa. D. & C. 358, 10
1985]
MARQUETTE LAW REVIEW
Perhaps the most controversial approach used thus far is the
dual capacity doctrine.
B. The Dual Capacity Doctrine
The dual capacity doctrine is a judicially created exception
to the exclusive remedy provision in worker's compensation
law. 7 Under the dual capacity doctrine an employer can be-
come a third party, amenable to suit by an employee, if the
employer acts in a second capacity, independent of and unre-
lated to his capacity as employer.7 The doctrine has been ex-
tended to apply to company doctors based on the idea that he
has two working capacities: one as a co-employee of the in-
jured worker, and the other as an independent professional
physician subject to liability.79 The second capacity arises be-
cause the relationship between a physician and his patient
generates duties and obligations separate and unrelated to
those existing between employees.8 0 Adoption of the dual ca-
pacity doctrine is the apparent result of an unwillingness on
the part of the courts to allow a licensed practitioner to escape
liability for his negligence because he is technically a member
of an immune class.8'
1. Other Jurisdictions
The California Supreme Court became the first court to adopt
the dual capacity doctrine in a medical context in Duprey v.
Shane."2 In Duprey the plaintiff suffered an injury while work-
ing for a chiropractic partnership and was negligently treated
by one of the partners.8 3 The court held that the partner acted
PITrSB. LEG. J. 439 (1953)(negligence of physician not in furtherance of the business of
employer); Volk v. City of New York, 284 N.Y. 279, 30 N.E.2d 596 (1940)(medical
negligence does not arise in course of employment).
77. For a discussion of the dual capacity doctrine see Kelly, Workmen's Compensa-
tion and Employer Suability: The Dual-Capacity Doctrine, 5 ST. MARY'S L.J. 818
(1973).
78. 2A A. LARSON, supra note 3, § 72.81, at 14-229.
79. Id. § 72.61(b).
80. See Note, The No-Duty Rule, supra note 15, at 685. See generally Duprey v.
Shane, 39 Cal. 2d 781, 249 P.2d 8 (1952); Wright v. District Court 661 P.2d 1167 (Colo.
1983).
81. See generally Note, Company Physicians, supra note 20, at 594.
82. 39 Cal. 2d 781, 249 P.2d 8 (1952).
83. Id. at -, 249 P.2d at 10.
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in dual capacities, as an employer and also as an attending
doctor.84 By acting as a doctor, the partner was "a person
other than the employer"85 and thus was subject to liability. 86
The court reasoned that the partner did not treat the plaintiff
because of the employer-employee relationship but rendered
treatment as an attending doctor in a physician-patient rela-
tionship.8 7 After adoption of its co-employee immunity provi-
sion, 88 the California Supreme Court extended the dual
capacity doctrine to apply to company doctors as well. In
Hoffman v. Rogers89 the court accepted the Duprey rationale
in holding a full-time, salaried company doctor liable for mal-
practice, reasoning that "[t]here is nothing in the [co-em-
ployee] amendment to undermine the dual personality
theory." 90 Unfortunately, the holding in Hoffman has had lit-
tle acceptance among courts in other jurisdictions.
Though not expressly applying the dual capacity doctrine,
several courts have used a dual capacity approach in deter-
mining the liability of its company doctors. In Garcia v. Iser-
son9' the New York Court of Appeals held that a defendant
doctor, who spent four hours a day, three days a week on the
employer's premises attending to injured employees, was one
"in the same employ" as the plaintiff and thus was immune
from an action for malpractice.92 The court emphasized the
84. Id. at -, 249 P.2d at 15.
85. See CAL. LAB. CODE § 3601(a) (West Supp. 1984).
86. 39 Cal. at -, 249 P. 2d at 15. See also Douglas v. E. & J. Gallo Winery, 69
Cal. App. 3d 103, 110, 137 Cal. Rptr. 797, 801 (1977).
87. Id.
88. See supra note 15.
89. 22 Cal. App. 3d 655, 99 Cal. Rptr. 455 (1972).
90. Id. at -, 99 Cal. Rptr. at 460. California, however, has not applied the dual
capacity doctrine in every medical malpractice case. In Dixon v. Ford Motor Co., 53
Cal. App. 3d 499, 125 Cal. Rptr. 872 (1975), a worker died because the first aid staff
negligently failed to provide proper treatment. The court did not allow suit by the
widow because the worker's compensation benefits were the exclusive remedy when the
death occurred in the course of employment. The court explained that Duprey was a
unique situation where the employer was also a doctor. Id. at 507, 125 Cal. Rptr. at
877. Accord Deauville v. Hall, 188 Cal. App. 2d 535, 10 Cal. Rptr. 511 (1961). But see
D'Angona v. County of Los Angeles, 27 Cal. 3d 661, 613 P.2d 238 (1980), where the
plaintiff, an employee at a county hospital, contracted a disease in the course of her
work and was negligently treated by the hospital staff. The court allowed suit against
the hospital relying on Duprey.
91. 33 N.Y.2d 421, 309 N.E.2d 420, 353 N.Y.S.2d 955 (1974).
92. Id. at 423, 309 N.E.2d at 421, 353 N.Y.S.2d at 957.
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fact that the medical treatment was "incidental" to the em-
ployment because the plaintiff was treated "not as a member
of the public but only in consequence of his employment.
93
The court compared this situation with one in an earlier New
York case in which it was held that the doctor was not im-
mune to a suit for malpractice because he was acting in differ-
ent capacities.94 In Volk v. City of New York, 95 the plaintiff, a
nurse who became ill while on duty, received negligent treat-
ment at the hospital where she was employed. 96 Using a dual
capacity framework, the court noted that in rendering treat-
ment to the nurse the hospital was acting in its professional
capacity rather than in its capacity as her employer. 97 The
Garcia court construed the holding in Volk to apply only
when the medical services are available to the general public,
thus distinguishing it from the instant case where the doctor
treated only employees while he was on the employer's
premises. 98
This questionable distinction was accepted by the Michi-
gan Court of Appeals in the case of Fletcher v. Harafajee.99 In
Fletcher a police officer was shot while on duty and subse-
quently received negligent medical treatment from a city med-
ical center."° The court allowed a malpractice action to be
brought against the treating doctors despite the objection by
the doctors that the police officers and their status as employ-
ees of the city rendered them immune from suit under their
co-employee immunity provision. 101 The court reasoned that
it would be unfair to apply the co-employee immunity provi-
93. Id. See Schulz v. Wyckoff Hospital, 51 A.D.2d 1026, 381 N.Y.S.2d 126 (1976).
94. Garcia, 33 N.Y.2d at 424, 309 N.E.2d at 421-22, 353 N.Y.S.2d at 957
95. 284 N.Y. 279, 30 N.E.2d 596 (1940).
96. Id. at -, 30 N.E.2d at 597.
97. Id. The court explained:
[T]he risk of the injury which plaintiff suffered was not incidental to her
employment. It was a risk to which any one [sic] receiving like treatment at the
hospital would have been subjected. The occurrence of the injury was not made
more likely by the fact of her employment. Consequently, the injury did not arise
out of and in the course thereof (citations omitted).
Id. at 283, 30 N.E.2d at 597.
98. 33 N.Y.2d at 424, 309 N.E.2d at 422, 353 N.Y.S. at 957. See also Note, The
No-Duty Rule, supra note 15, at 688.
99. 100 Mich. App. 440, 299 N.W.2d 53 (1980).




sion to government employees because they carry out many
diverse and unrelated functions. °2 The court distinguished
this case from Jones v. Bouza10 3 where the Michigan Supreme
Court held that a full-time staff physician was a co-employee
and thus immune from malpractice liability. 1°4 The Fletcher
court observed that in the instant case, the doctor was not
employed for the sole purpose of treating employees. Rather,
his services were available to the general public.0 5
The distinction between medical treatment in a company
clinic and medical treatment in a public facility has little logi-
cal basis.10 6 To hold, as the courts in New York and Michi-
gan have, that the ability to maintain an action for
malpractice depends upon where the employee is treated im-
plies that protection of the negligent party is more important
in worker's compensation theory than protection of the in-
jured worker. 107
While most courts have either applied the dual capacity
doctrine in a limited fashion or rejected it entirely,10 8 at least
one court has adopted the California position in Hoffman and
102. Id. at -, 299 N.W.2d at 55.
103. 381 Mich. 299, 160 N.W.2d 881 (1968).
104. Id. at -, 160 N.W.2d at 882. The court strictly construed the co-employee
immunity provision reasoning that the legislature intended to abolish all common-law
actions against fellow employees, malpractice being no exception. Id. See also Sergeant
v. Kennedy, 352 Mich. 494, 90 N.W.2d 447 (1958).
105. 100 Mich. App. at -, 299 N.W.2d at 55.
106. See Note, The No-Duty Rule, supra note 15, at 688-89; McCormick v. Cater-
pillar Tractor Co., 85 Ill. 2d 852, -, 423 N.E.2d 876, 883-84 (1981)(Simon, J.,
dissenting).
107. See supra notes 3-12 and accompanying text.
108. The Illinois Supreme Court rejected application of the dual capacity doctrine
in a medical context in McCormick, 85 Ill. 2d 352, 423 N.E.2d 876. The plaintiff in-
jured his foot in the course of his employment and was negligently treated by two com-
pany doctors. The appellate court held that the dual capacity doctrine did not apply to
the doctor but did apply to the employer under Duprey and Smith v. Metropolitan
Sanitary Dist. 77 Ill. 2d 313, 396 N.E.2d 524 (1979). The Illinois Supreme Court held
that the dual capacity doctrine that was applied in Smith did not apply in this case. The
test for dual capacity, the court stated, "is whether the employer's conduct in the sec-
ond role or capacity has generated obligations that are unrelated to those flowing from
the company's or individual's first role as an employer." Id. at -, 423 N.E.2d at 878.
Because the Illinois Worker's Compensation Act required the employer to provide med-
ical services, the court concluded that the employer was merely fulfilling a duty imposed
upon it by the Act and was thus acting only in its employer capacity. Id. See also
Collier v. Wagner Castings Co., 70 Ill. App. 3d 233, 388 N.E.2d 265 (1979), aff'd, 81 111.
2d 229, 408 N.E.2d 198 (1980); Komel v. Commonwealth Edison Co., 56 Ill. App. 3d
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applied the doctrine to company doctors. 10 9 The Supreme
Court of Colorado in Wright v. District Court10 expressly fol-
lowing the holdings in Duprey and Hoffman,"' held that a
full-time company doctor occupied the dual capacities of co-
employee and physician and, in the latter capacity, was sub-
ject to liability for malpractice."' The second capacity,
explained the court, resulted in the new relationship of physi-
967, 372 N.E.2d 842 (1977); Hayes v. Marshall Field Co., 357 II1. App. 329, 115 N.E.2d
99 (1953).
The New Jersey Superior Court rejected the dual capacity doctrine in Boyle v.
Breme, 187 N.J. Super. 129, 453 A.2d 1335 (1982), affid, 93 N.J. 569, 461 A. 2d 1164
(1983), where an injured employee attempted to sue a company doctor for malpractice
because creating exceptions to the co-employee immunity provision was the function of
the legislature. The court recognized that in enacting and amending its worker's com-
pensation act, the legislature had "constructed a highly technical framework of complex
design and complicated parts....[this court] should not threaten the integrity of this
scheme by presuming an exception in the case of a coemployee who happens to be a
doctor." Id. at -, 453 A.2d at 1337. See Bergen v. Miller, 104 N.J. Super. 350, 250
A.2d 49 (1969).
The Mississippi Supreme Court in Trotter v. Litton Systems, Inc., 370 So. 2d 244
(Miss. 1979), likewise held the dual capacity doctrine inapplicable absent legislative en-
actment. The court refused to allow an employee, who suffered the loss of a thumb
through the negligent treatment of a cut on his thumb by a nurse in the employer's
clinic, to sue his employer because aggravation of a compensable injury is compensable,
thus the employer's immunity extends to the subsequent negligent act. Id. at -, 370
So. 2d at 247.
For other cases in which courts have rejected the dual capacity doctrine in a medical
context, see Budzichowski v. Bell Telephone Co., 299 Pa. Super 392, 445 A.2d 811
(1982); McAlister v. Methodist Hospital of Memphis, 550 S.W.2d 240 (Tenn. 1977);
Warwick v. Hudson Pulp & Paper Co., 303 So. 2d 701 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1974).
109. The Supreme Court of Ohio has accepted the Duprey rationale in holding a
hospital liable to an employee for malpractice but has not extended the doctrine as far
as the court in Hoffman in holding a company doctor liable for malpractice. In Proctor
v. Ford Motor Co., 36 Ohio St. 2d 3, 302 N.E.2d 580 (1973), the court held that full-
time salaried physicians employed to operate a plant medical facility were employees
within the meaning of their co-employee immunity provision and thus were immune
from liability for malpractice. Five years later the court in Guy v. Arthur H. Thomas
Co., 55 Ohio St. 2d 183, 378 N.E.2d 488 (1978), held an employer-hospital liable for
failing to diagnose an employee's medical condition, which she contracted during the
course of her employment, as mercury poisoning. The court, citing Duprey, adopted the
dual capacity doctrine, concluding that "[t]he appellee hospital, with respect to its treat-
ment of the appellant, did so as a hospital, not as an employer, and its relationship with
the appellant was that of a hospital-patient with all the concomitant traditional obliga-
tions." Id. at -, 378 N.E.2d at 492. The court declined to expressly overrule Proctor,
implying that the dual capacity doctrine does not extend to company doctors. Id. See
2A A. LARSON, supra note 3, § 72.61(b), at 14-204 n.65.3.
110. 661 P.2d 1167 (1983).




cian-patient generating duties and obligations unrelated to the
employment relationship. 113 Stressing the importance of the
physician-patient relationship, the court concluded that no
doctor, whether employed in a company clinic or working in
private practice, should be able to disclaim liability for mal-
practice.114 The court criticized the holdings in Garcia and
Fletcher for drawing the distinction that an employee who is
treated at a hospital receives the same services as the general
public while the employee who is treated at a company clinic
receives services merely as an incident of his employment." 5
The court explained,
It is not the public practice of medicine which creates a
dual capacity for the attending physician; it is the very prac-
tice of medicine, with its special duties and responsibilities,
which charges a doctor with all of the obligations which nor-
mally arise in the doctor-patient relationship. One's need for
protection from malpractice is not affected by the configura-
tion of the employment relationship or the location of the
treatment. 1 16
Arguing that holding a company doctor liable for malpractice
is consistent with the policies underlying worker's compensa-
tion law, the court also observed that the reasons justifying
tort immunity for employers and employees are not applicable
when the tortfeasor is a company doctor. 1 7
113. Id.
114. Id. at-,-, 661 P.2d at 1168, 1171.
115. Id. at-, 661 P.2d at 1170.
116. Id. (emphasis in original).
117. Id. 2A A. LARSON supra note 3, § 72.81, at 14-229-31. Because of the con-
fusion with the term "dual capacity" Larson substitutes the term "dual persona" in its
place, explaining:
In a sense, a single legal person may be said to have many "capacities," since
that term has no fixed legal meaning. As a result, a few courts have stretched the
doctrine so far as to destroy employer immunity whenever there was, not a sepa-
rate legal person, but merely a separate relationship or theory of liability. When
one considers how many such added relations an employer might have in the
course of a day's work...it is plain enough that this trend could go a long way
toward demolishing the exclusive remedy principle ...
The choice of the term "persona"... is dictated by the literal language of
the third-party statute, which usually defines a third party,in the first instance, as
"aperson other than the employer." This is quite different from "a person acting
in a capacity other than that of employer.
Id. §. 72.81, at 14-229 to 14-231 (emphasis in original).
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The dual capacity doctrine, despite being based on sound
public policy considerations, has received little acceptance by
the courts and has been criticized by Professor Larson because
it has been misapplied, abused, and overextended by the
courts. 18 Specifically criticizing the extension of the doctrine
to company doctors, Larson states,
The fallacy in this extension is simply that the company
doctor does not have two capacities. He has only one: com-
pany doctor. That is the entire extent of his relation to his
co-employees. All he does, all day long, is perform in this
single capacity in relation to his co-employees.1 19
Although there is some logic to Professor Larson's argument
against application of the dual capacity doctrine to company
doctors, he seems to ignore the fact that many worker's com-
pensation acts implicitly destroy the traditional common-law
duties of a group of doctors. Despite the criticism that they
have overextended the dual capacity doctrine beyond justifi-
able limits, 2 ' the courts in Hoffman and Wright should be
commended for recognizing the importance of the physician-
patient relationship and attempting to preserve its concomi-
tant rights, duties, and obligations in the face of careless
legislation.
2. Wisconsin
In 1982 the Supreme Court of Wisconsin rejected applica-
tion of the dual capacity doctrine in Jenkins v. Sabourin.12 1 In
Jenkins, the plaintiff was injured by the prank of a fellow em-
ployee. Because the accident occured before the legislature
amended section 102.03(2) granting tort immunity to employ-
ees,122 the plaintiff brought a third party action against the
118. Id. § 72.61(b), at 14-203--04. See Wright, 661 P.2d at 1172 & n.2 (Hodges, C.
J., dissenting). It is interesting to note that some courts which have cited Larson's
Workmen's Compensation Law for support in applying the dual capacity doctrine have
been criticized for such application in a subsequent edition. See, e.g., D'Angona v.
County of Los Angeles, 27 Cal. 3d 661, 613 P.2d 238, 166 Cal. Rptr. 177 (1980) and 2A
A. LARSON, supra note 3, § 72.61(c), at 14-209-11.
119. See 2A A. LARSON, supra note 3, § 72.61(b) at 14-203 - 204.
120. See Id. at 45.43(a).
121. 104 Wis. 2d 309, 311 N.W.2d 600 (1981).
122. The accident occurred on March 31, 1976. 104 Wis. 2d at 311, 311 N.W.2d at




defendant-co-employee, the defendant's insurance company,
and the employer as nominal defendant for subrogation pur-
poses.12 3 The defendants cross-claimed against the employer
for contribution, claiming against the employer for contribu-
tion and arguing that there was a failure to exercise ordinary
care in the course of providing medical attention to the plain-
tiff.'24 On the motion of the employer the trial court dis-
missed the cross-claim on the grounds that, because the
aggravation of the injury was compensable under the Act, the
employer was immune from all liability for any injuries arising
out of the employment, including injuries from negligent med-
ical treatment.125 The Wisconsin Supreme Court agreed with
the reasoning of the trial court: "[iut is established Wisconsin
law that, when an employee is treated for a work-related in-
jury and incurs an additional injury during the course of treat-
ment, the second injury is deemed as one growing out of, and
incident to, employment . . . . and subjects the employer
only to compensation liability and not to damages in tort." 126
The defendants argued that the dual capacity doctrine ap-
plied, contending that when the employer undertook to render
medical services to the employee, it stepped out of its role as
employer and assumed the role of medical services provider
with no immunity under the Act.127 The court rejected this
contention reasoning that the employer did not enter into a
new capacity but merely provided medical services in its ca-
pacity as employer as required by the Act.128 "The obligation
to a work-injured employee of the medical-service function,"
the court explained, "stemmed wholly from, and was a part
of, the employer's function and is mandated by the Worker's
Compensation Act."1 29
Although the defendants in Jenkins declined to bring an
action against the treating doctor, the court hinted in dicta
that such an action might be permissible.1 30 Interestingly, in
123. 104 Wis. 2d at 311-12, 311 N.W.2d at 602.
124. Id. at 312, 311 N.W.2d at 602.
125. Id.
126. Id. at 316, 311 N.W.2d at 604.
127. Id.
128. Id. at 319, 311 N.W.2d at 605.
129. Id.
130. Id at 322, 311 N.W.2d at 607.
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briefly discussing the liability of a company doctor the court
made no mention of the newly-enacted co-employee immunity
provision.131 The court instead relied upon section
102.29(3)132 in observing that "[flacially, it would appear,
although we do not decide, that the worker could recover
under this statute even from a physician who served full-time
on an employer's staff." 133 Thus it appears that the court is
willing to hold company doctors liable for malpractice
notwithstanding the enactment of the provision granting im-
munity to co-employees. Therefore, Wisconsin courts can
preserve the rights, duties and obligations of the physician-
patient relationship based on a plain reading of section
102.20(3) rather than resorting to the independent contractor
theory, the dual capacity doctrine, or other judically created
fictions.
V. ARGUMENTS AGAINST COMPANY DOCTOR IMMUNITY
Because of his special role in the workplace, the arguments
for granting immunity from tort liability to an employee are
not valid when applied to a company doctor. As stated previ-
ously, the idea of co-employee immunity recognizes a quid pro
quo among employees. 3 The company doctor does not par-
ticipate in this reciprocol exchange of rights; he is removed
from the production area making it far less likely that he will
be injured by a co-employee's negligence than for a co-em-
ployee to be harmed by his negligence. Thus, realistically, the
company doctor does not give up a common-law right to sue
in return for co-employee immunity. 135
Another reason for co-employee immunity and worker's
compensation in general is the idea that fault is difficult to
trace when the injury occurs in a complex industrial environ-
ment.1 36 This justification is inapplicable to injuries resulting
131. The amendment of Wis. STAT. § 102.03(2)(1981-82) was mentioned at the
beginning of the decision. Id. at 311 n.2, 311 N.W.2d at 602 n.2.
132. 104 Wis. 2d at 322, 311 N.W.2d at 607.
133. Id.
134. See supra note 16 and accompanying text.
135. See Note, The No-Duty Rule, supra note 15, at 676-77; Note, Company Physi-
cians, supra note 20, at 597. See also Wright v. District Court, 661 P.2d 1167, 1170
(1983). But see 2A A. LARSON, supra note 3, § 72.61(b), at 14-205---06.
136. PROSSER, supra note 5, § 80, at 527.
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from medical malpractice. Unlike common employee negli-
gence, medical negligence occurs after the original injury and
in a place separate from the production area.1 37 Moreover,
the acts of the doctor can be evaluated in accordance with
established medical standards.13 It has been argued that be-
cause the theory of worker's compensation is fault-based judg-
ing doctors alone on fault is unfair and contrary to the act. 39
Yet this argument ignores the very reason that worker's com-
pensation is not fault-based in the first instance: the burdens
of proving fault and overcoming the common-law defenses
consistently left workers without an adequate remedy.14°
Also, it is more unfair for an injured worker to be inade-
quately compensated than it is to hold a doctor responsible for
not maintaining a minimal level of competency.14 1
Finally, co-employee immunity is a further recognition
that industrial accidents are the inevitable result of the inti-
mate relationship between people and machines. 242 Unlike the
risk of injury from employee negligence, the risk of injury
from medical malpractice in not inherent in the production
process 143 nor is the injury therefrom an inevitable conse-
quence of our highly industrial age.144 Legislatures clearly did
not contemplate this in creating worker's compensation
schemes. 145 It is argued, however, that it is not the connection
with the workplace that determines the perimeters of immu-
137. See McCormick v. Caterpillar Tractor Co., 85 Ill. 2d 352, -, 423 N.E.2d 876,
881 (1981)(Simon, J., dissenting) where Justice Simon explains that a "malpractice
claim is based on a second injury, a distinct event, an obviously separate nexus of facts."
See also Tropiano v. Travelers Ins. Co., 455 Pa. 360, 363, 319 A.2d 426, 427 (1974).
138. Note, The No-Duty Rulesupra note 15, Wright, 661 P.2d at 1170.
139. Wright, -Colo. at -, 661 P.2d at 1172 (Hodges, C. J., dissenting).
140. See supra notes 4-9 and accompanying text.
141. The Virginia Court of Appeals in Fauver v. Bell, 192 Va. 518, -, 65 S.E.2d
575, 578 (1951), explained that the difference between the liability of the employer and
the liability of the company doctor arises from the different purposes of the two
recoveries:
Employer's liability is not based upon tort or other wrongful conduct on the
employer's part, but because it is incident to the relationship of employer-em-
ployee and a part of employer's contractual liability under the Act. On the other
hand, the liability of the malpracticing physician is based upon negligence, a tort,
and a tort recovery is for damages for the full wrong.
142. Note, The No-Duty Rule, supra note 15, at 675-76.
143. Id.
144. See Ross v. Schubert, 180 Ind. App. 402, 388 N.E.2d 623 (1979).
145. Wright, -Colo. at--, 661 P.2d at 1170.
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nity but rather the employment status of the doctor at the
time of the negligent act. 146 This common misconception re-
sults from an overly mechanical interpretation of co-employee
immunity and a neglect of one of the main reasons for the
development of worker's compensation: increasing industrial
accidents due to changing industrial conditions. 14 7  While
some state that worker's compensation is based on the fact of
employment, 148 it is really more accurate to say, in light of the
underlying purposes of worker's compensation law, that cov-
erage under the act is based upon the type of accident rather
than the status of a particular person at the time of the acci-
dent. 4 9 As one court correctly observed, "[iln essence an
award under the Act is based upon a statutory jurisdiction
over a certain class of industrial accidents and only as a deri-
vation thereof over those persons connected with them."' 150
The same court followed this reasoning two years later in con-
cluding that "[ain injury sustained due to the malpractice of a
physician does not come within the class of industrial acci-
dents which the Act was designed to encompass."' 15 1
Clearly, the reasons which justify granting tort immunity
to co-employees are not nearly as persuasive when attempting
to justify extending this immunity to company doctors.'52 In
addition to the practical arguments discussed above, there are
146. See McNeil v. Diffenbaugh, 105 Ill. App. 3d 350, -, 434 N.E.2d 377, 380
(1982).
147. See supra notes 3-4 and accompanying text.
148. See supra note 9 and accompanying text.
149. See Ross, 180 Ind. App. at -, 388 N.E.2d at 628 n.6, where the court ex-
plained that co-employee immunity results "because of the type of accident involved,
not because of a direct objective to immunize particular persons."
150. O'Dell v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., - Ind. App. -, -, 362 N.E. 2d
862, 866 (1977).
151. Ross, 180 Ind. App. -, 388 N.E.2d 628 n.6. See supra notes 55-62 and ac-
companying text.
152. See McCormick, 85 Ill. 2d. at -, 423 N.E.2d at 884 (Simon, J., dissenting)
where Justice Simon, arguing for adoption of the dual capacity doctrine, added,
"[i]ndustrial medical malpractice is just like any other medical malpractice, with none
of the special problems that led the legislature to a special solution for industrial acci-
dents."
Another justification for co-employee immunity which is inapplicable to the com-
pany doctor is accident deterrence. The threat of liability gives the employer an eco-
nomic incentive to prevent accidents. He is able to do this because he controls the
workplace; i.e., he supervises the training, assigning, disciplining, and organizing of em-
ployees. Because the employer cannot exercise any significant control over the com-
pany doctor there is little deterrent effect in making him responsible for medical
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also sound public policy reasons for not extending tort immu-
nity to company doctors.
Because of the great societal interest in competent medical
treatment, courts have uniformly imposed a high duty of care
on those persons rendering such treatment. 153 The purpose of
the duty, explained one court, "is to protect the health and
lives of the public. . from the unskillfulness or negligence of
medical practitioners, by holding such practitioners liable to
respond in damages for the results of their unskillfulness or
negligence."1 54 This purpose is no less important with respect
to the duty of company doctors.
The relationship between a company doctor and an in-
jured worker is more than just an employee-co-employee rela-
tionship; it is a physician-patient relationship with all its
concommitant rights, duties, and obligations.1 55 Abrogating
the duties and obligations that a doctor owes to his patient
removes much incentive to render quality medical care. 156
One court expressed its concern that rampant malpractice
would result if company doctors were granted immunity:
That independent professions by the fact of business contact
with the employer should be absolved of responsibility for
mistake, avoidable or unjustified neglect resulting in secon-
dary affliction, seems obnoxious to the purpose and spirit of
such a statute. To so hold might induce industry to en-
courage quackery, and place a premium upon negligence,
inefficiency and wanton disregard of the professional obliga-
tions of medical departments of industry, toward the
artisan.1 57
malpractice. See Note, The No-Duty Rule, supra note 15, at 677. See also Wright, -
Colo. at -, 661 P.2d at 1171.
153. 61 AM. JUR. 2D Physicians, Surgeons, and Other Healers § 200 (1981).
154. Nelson v. Harrington, 72 Wis. 591, 598, 40 N.W. 228, 230 (1888). Accord
Hrubes v. Faber, 163 Wis. 89, 94, 157 N.W. 579 (1916); 61 AM. JUR 2D Physicians,
Surgeons, and other Healers § 200, at 332.
155. Wright, -Colo. at -, 661 P. 2d at 1171. See also Boyle v. Breme, 93 N.J.
569, -, 461 A.2d 1164, 1167 (1983) (Handler, J., dissenting). See generally Comment,
The Patient-Physician Relationship: Present Law and Trends for the Future Implied in
Cobbs v. Grant, 8 U.S.F.L. REV. 320 (1973-74).
156. Wright, - Colo. at -, 661 P.2d at 1171; Ross 180 Ind. App. at -, 388
N.E.2d at 629, Hancock v. Halliday, 65 Idaho 645, -, 150 P.2d 137, 146 (1944); Note,
The No-Duty Rule, supra note 15, at 677-78; Note, Company Physicians, supra note 20,
at 597.
157. Duprey v. Shane, 39 Cal. 2d 781, 791, 249 P.2d 8, 14 (1952)(quoting Smith v.
Golden State Hospital, 111 Cal. App. 667, 672, 296 P. 127, 129 (1931). Accord Ross,
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This concern is well justified in the case of company doctors
who possess an especially poor reputation among health-care
providers.1 58
An injured worker's relationship with a company doctor is
identical to that of a patient with a private doctor.159 A pa-
tient treated by a private doctor has the right to expect the
doctor to exercise reasonable care and the right to hold the
doctor responsible in damages for any mistreatment. 160 Cer-
tainly an injured employee can expect no less. His need for
protection from malpractice is the same as any other person 161
and should not be affected by the employment status of the
treating doctor.1 62 It is incongruous to permit an injured
worker a tort recovery from a negligent private doctor but not
from a company doctor. 163 There is no reason why an em-
ployee should lose his rights simply because he chose to be
treated by a company doctor rather than a private one. 164
This incongruity was noted in the dissenting opinion of the
Illinois Supreme Court in McCormick v. Caterpillar Tractor
Co. :165
McCormick's waiver of his tort rights by going to the
Caterpillar clinic is especially unfair because there was noth-
ing to warn him of the legal effect of his apparently innocu-
ous choice of doctors. He did not understand what he was
giving up for the convenience of a doctor on the work
premises. 166
Another reason why an employee's right to maintain an
action for malpractice against a company doctor should be
180 Ind. App. at-, 388 N.E.2d at 629; Hoffman v. Rogers, 22 Cal. App. 3d 655, 661,
99 Cal. Rptr. 455, 459 (1972); Hancock, 65 Idaho at-, 150 P.2d at 146.
158. Note, The No-Duty Rule, supra note 15, at 678.
159. Wright, 661 P.2d at 1168.
160. 61 AM. JUR. 2D Physicians, Surgeons, and Other Healers § 201 (1981).
161. D'Angona v. County of Los Angeles, 27 Cal. 3d 661, 668, 613 P.2d 238, 243-
44, 166 Cal. Rptr. 177, 182 (1980); Guy v. Arthur H. Thomas Co., 55 Ohio St. 183, -,
378 N.E.2d 488, 492 (1978).
162. Wright, 661 P.2d at 1170; Ross, 180 Ind. App. at -, 388 N.E.2d at 629.
163. See Wright, - Colo. at-, 661 P.2d at 1170. But see Jenkins v. Sabourin, 104
Wis. 2d 309, 321, 311 N.W.2d 600, 606 (1981), where the court says this incongruity is
"part and parcel of the compromise that constitutes the Workers Compensation Act."
164. See McCormick, 85 Ill. 2d at -, 423 N.E.2d at 883-84 (1981) (Simon J.,
dissenting).
165. 85 Il1. 2d at -, 423 N.E.2d at 880-87.
166. Id. at -,423 N.E.2d at 883-84.
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preserved is the general inadequacy of worker's compensation
benefits. The employee's recovery under worker's compensa-
tion is fixed by statute. He receives full compensation for
medical expenses but is only partially compensated for loss of
earnings and receives no compensation for pain and suffering,
disfigurement, and other losses unrelated to earnings. 16 7 This
is because recovery is based not upon wrongful conduct but
upon the contractual liability of the employer. 168 In a medical
malpractice situation the loss from pain and suffering and dis-
figurement can be greatly enhanced, yet the victim receives no
corresponding increase in benefits.1 69 The worker whose in-
jury is aggravated by the wrongful conduct of a licensed doc-
tor should have the right to be made whole, not just partially
whole. 170
By allowing company doctors to disclaim liability for their
own negligence courts effectively shift the cost of malpractice
to the worker, the party that can least afford it.1 71 This is in-
consistent with a basic tenet of worker's compensation law
which holds that the cost of industrial accidents should be
borne by the employer as the most efficient risk-bearer and
cost distributor. 172 Company doctors, however, through
higher incomes and professional liability insurance, are much
more likely to be able to pay the cost of their malpractice.1 73
The employer can still serve as the risk distributor by paying
the doctor's insurance premiums or by agreeing to compen-
sate workers for the doctor's malpractice. 174
167. 1 A. LARSON, supra note 3, §§ 2.40-50, at 10-12.
168. Ross 180 Ind. App. at -, 388 N.E.2d at 629-30 n.ll.
169. Note, Company Physicians, supra note 20, at 598-99.
170. Ross, 180 Ind. App. at -, 388 N.E.2d at 629-30 n. 11. See also Hancock, 65
Idaho at 650, 150 P.2d at 140, where the court explains that granting the doctor immu-
nity would "permit the wrongdoer to go practically unscathed for grievous damage to
another, and would likewise sentence the workman to a lifetime of dreary and hopeless
existence through inability to work and live a normal life. . .with his only compensa-
tion limited to a sum totally inadequate to cover his sustained losses."
171. See Note, The No-Duty Rule, supra note 15, at 676.
172. See supra note 12 and accompanying text.
173. Note, Company Physicians, supra note 20, at 597.




The problem of company doctor immunity is basically a
conflict between a literal statutory interpretation of a co-em-
ployee immunity provision and the public policy considera-
tions which underlie the rights, duties and obligations of the
physician-patient relationship. While most courts recognize
the importance of encouraging quality medical care, few are
willing to interfere with their legislature's comprehensive, well
thought out worker's compensation schemes. Courts in Wis-
consin do not face such a problem. The legislature has al-
ready provided for the malpractice liability of medical
practitioners. The co-employee immunity provision should in
no way be interpreted as an abrogation of the traditional com-
mon-law right of a employee to bring a malpractice action
against a company doctor, a right that has been carefully pro-
tected in Wisconsin worker's compensation law.
MICHAEL L. FARRELL
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